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of fees out of the proceeds of the sale, there would seem to be adequate
grounds for denying him a priority over an intervening mortgagee's
interest. There would also seem to be ample authority for such a holding
on the basis of Young v. Stone, supra. In that case the assessment of
the fees against the property of those who might have received some
tenuous benefit was denied because all the parties did not benefit. Al-
though there was a definite contract for compensation, the court said
that the fact that the service was not for the "common benefit of all"
was equally decisive of the case. In Klosterman v. Klosternm there was
no apparent benefit to the other defendants nor to the mortgagee.
A zealous attorney can usually find a speculative or theoretical
benefit on which to base the allowance of fees when the allowance tends
to be made on the basis of custom and inertia without a strict examina-
tion of the merits of the claim. The general rule in other proceedings in
this country is to have each party pay his own attorney. If the question
of benefit is put in issue it would seem reasonable to make the plaintiff's
attorney bear the usual burden of proof as to the existence and amount
of benefit conferred on the defendant.
ARTHUR N. MINDLING
SALES
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO AUTOMOBILES UNDER NEW CERTIFI-
CATE OF TITLE ACT
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. The City Loan & Savings
Go. v. Taggart, Recorder, 134 Ohio St. 374, 17 N.E. (2d) 758, de-
cided November 16, 1938, upheld the constitutionality and validity of
sections 6290-2 to 6290-17 of the General Code enacted in 1937 which
repealed code sections 6310-3 to 6310-14 relating to motor vehicles
and requiring a bill of sale to be executed in accordance with the pro-
visions of the act which imposed a penalty in case of failure to comply.
The new Certificate of Title ict provides that tide to all motor vehicles
owned and operated in Ohio be represented by certificates of title. Code
section 6290-2 provides that "no manufacturer, importer, dealer, or
other person shall sell or otherwise dispose of a new motor vehicle to a
dealer to be used by such dealer for purposes of display and resale with-
out delivering to such dealer a manufacturer's or importer's certificate
duly executed in accordance [with the act] and with such assignments
thereon as may be necessary to show tide in the purchaser thereof; nor
shall such dealer purchase or acquire a new motor vehicle without obtain-
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ing from the seller thereof such manufacturer's or importer's certificate."
Code section 6290-4 adds: "nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in
favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate
of title or manufacturer's or importer's certificate for said motor vehicle
for a valuable consideration. No court in any case in law or in equity
shall recognize the right, tide, claim or interest of any person in or to
any motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or
encumbered, unless evidenced by [such certificates]." (Italics supplied).
The act then authorizes the forms to be used and methods of securing
the same, making it mandatory upon the transferor to record liens and
encumbrances thereon. It is expressly stipulated that code sections 856o
to 8572, inclusive, relating to the deposit of chattel mortgages with the
county recorder, shall not be construed to apply to motor vehicles. Code
section 6290-17 makes the operation of a motor vehicle without a cer-
tificate of tide unlawful. The court in the instant case stated at p. 375,
17 N.E. (2d) 759:
"It is apparent that the primary object of the new law is to afford
an effective means of transferring and recording the evidence of tide
to motor vehicles in one continuous chain from the beginning to the
end of their existence in Ohio . . . and to eliminate several well known
and flagrant types of abuse which were perpetrated under the old 'Bill
of Sale Law'."
The old Bill of Sale Law did not expressly provide that tide could
not pass in any other manner than provided therein and the courts were
reluctant to decide at first whether the common law relinquishment of
possession with intent to pass title was sufficient to vest title in the pur-
chaser or donee thereof. Ferris v. Langston, 253 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923). There are many lines of authority on the effect of non-
compliance with such statutory requirements.
One group of cases holds that a statute merely prohibiting or making
unlawful a sale without requisite formality, does not affect the validity
of a civil contract, but is merely regulatory within the police powers of
the state. Moore v. Wilson, 18 S.W. (2d) 873 (Ky. 1929); Gaub v.
.Mosher, 3 N.J. Misc. 605, 129 Ad. 253 (1925); Willys-Overland,
Inc. v. Holliday, 284 S.W. 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Other courts
have held that noncompliance with the statute does not render the sale
void ab initio but that noncompliance is a suspicious circumstance suffi-
cient to put purchasers upon inquiry as to the vendor's tide, Wallich v.
Sandloich, 1ii Neb. 318, 196 N.W. 317 (1923); while others have
held the sale void unless the statute was complied with. Hammond
Motor Co. v. Warren, 113 Kan. 44, 213 Pac. 8io (1923); R8os v.
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Holleman De IVeerd Zutomobile Co., 246 Mich. 578, 225 N.W. i
(1929). See 37 A.L.R. 1465; 52 A.L.R. 701; 63 A.L.R. 688; 94
A.L.R. 948-
The Supreme Court of Ohio at first adhered to the view that non-
compliance with the statute renders the sale void. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.
v. Todino, iii Ohio St. 274, 145 N.E. 25 (1924), overruled by
Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N.E. 8o8
(1929). The dicta in the Todino case pointed out that "where a statute
is enacted to protect the public against fraud or imposition or to safe-
guard the public health or morals, a contract in violation thereof is void,
even though a money penalty also is enacted . . . the [statute's] sole
purpose was to prevent, in so far as possible, the stealing of automobiles
" and a recorded chattel mortgage by one who has no title has
no priority over a mortgagee in good faith for value from the owner.
Ohio Finance Co. v. McReynolds, 27 Ohio App. 42, 16o N.E. 727
(1927). It was held in Helwig v. Warren State Bank, I15 Ohio St.
182, 152 N.E. 298 (1926) that filing of a bill of sale was notice of
the grantee's rights and subsequent holders of interest took subject to
the grantee's rights though the grantee left the car with the grantor
who sold to an innocent purchaser. However, in Commercial Credit
Co. v. Schreyer, supra, the court overruled the Todino and Helwig
cases and the rule was settled that any assent or transfer of a motor
vehicle not violative of the Uniform Sales laws of the state, is, neverthe-
less, a valid contract between the parties thereto, although no bill of sale
was issued in compliance therewith. Gutridge v. State, 37 Ohio App. x,
173 N.E. 447 (930), petition in error dismissed, 122 Ohio St. 623,
174 N.E. 140 (1930); Willey v. Willey, 23 Ohio L.R. 305 (1924);
In re Greenbaum, 26 Ohio L.R. 607 (1928); Frankel Chevrolet Co.
v. Snyder, 37 Ohio App. 378, 174 N.E. 751 (930). The Commer-
cial Credit Co. case held the statute to be penal and did not declare the
contract for sale unlawful if delivery had been made, although one or
both of the parties may be criminally prosecuted for a violation of such
statutes in making the transfer [Fitzgerald v. National Bond Co., IO
Ohio L. Abs. 181 (931) ] since a bill of sale is prima facie evidence of
ownership. Cope-Shanks Motor Co. v. Herzig, 33 Ohio App. 345,
169 N.E. 581 (1929).
The Ohio courts have repeatedly stated both by way of decision and
by way of dictum that the Bill of Sales Act was enacted for the purpose
of preventing traffic in stolen automobiles. McMillan & Seiler Wail
Motor Co., 5 Ohio Op. 84 (1936); Willey v. Willey, supra. "The
sale of the automobile does not itself constitute malum rohibitum.
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There is nothing . .. in the usual automobile sale which per se endan-
gers the public safety or public morals. .... The purpose of the auto-
mobile bill of sale law, viewed as a whole, was not to prohibit trans-
actions in automobiles but to throw safe-guards around those transac-
tions." In re Greenbaum, supra, at p. 614.
The greatest difficulty under the Bill of Sales Act arose under the
Floor Plan Rule whereby an owner of an automobile, who placed a car
on the floor of a retail dealer's showroom for sale, was estopped to deny
the title of an innocent purchaser, who had purchased from such dealer
in the ordinary retail dealing, without knowledge of any conflicting
claim. National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co.,
124 Ohio St. 34, 176 N.E. 678 (931) (holding such estoppel did not
apply to a pledgee or mortgagee). Accord: Cincinnati Finance Co. v.
First Discount Corp., 59 Ohio App. 131, 12 Ohio Op. 42 (1938),
holding that a mortgagee who allowed automobiles to remain in the
possession of a mortgagor automobile dealer and permitted him to place
them in his display room for the ultimate purpose of sale, authorized the
dealer to negotiate for a sale, but did not authorize a sale free of the
mortgage. The mortgagee would lose his lien if the mortgagor had
actual authority to sell free of the lien or if the mortgagee had clothed
the mortgagor with apparent authority. In order that estoppel arise the
purchaser must have acted upon the appearance of authority. It is an
element of estoppel that the party claiming his opponent estopped must
show that he himself has done some act to his prejudice and has been
misled by the appearance set up by his opponent. Kokenge v. Whet-
stone, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 398, ii Ohio Op. 213 (1938). The dealer, in
transactions of this nature, could, by issuing a bill of sale to an innocent
purchaser, vest title in such purchaser, where, in fact, the title was in a
third party. The courts, in developing the rule, have said that the owner,
or one who has advanced the money to pay for the car, who permits it
to be kept in the salesroom of a dealer who holds himself out to the
world as the owner thereof and exhibits it for sale, thereby clothes the
dealer with such apparent ownership and authority to sell that he is
estopped to assert his own superior title as against a purchaser from the
dealer in good faith and for value in the regular course of business, who
was without knowledge or notice of the adverse claim thereto, Glass v.
Continental Guaranty Corp., 8i Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Mis-
souri Finance Corp. v. McCowan, io8 Kan. 622, 196 Pac. 614
(1921) ; National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Schenke, 8 Ohio Op.
36, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 236 (i937); Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, 199
N.Y. Supp. 583 (1923); Carmack v. Gordon, 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 979
(1893) (personal property of any sort), notwithstanding an agreement
by the dealer to deliver the car to no one except the owner or his order,
MlIissouri Finance Corp. v. McGowan, supra, and, on the same principle,
the owner is estopped as against one to whom the dealer assigns a con-
tract of conditional sale of the car to an innocent purchaser. Rogers
Lamb Co. v. Coast Securities Co., 58 Cal. App. 744, 209 Pac. 246
(1922). Under the new Certificate of Title Act, there will be less
fraud perpetrated by the dealer. While there was ample opportunity to
avoid encumbrances and liens under the old act as against bona fide pur-
chasers for value, it would appear that a purchaser would not be a
purchaser in good faith if no certificate were obtained pursuant to the
provisions of the statute. No dealer would be authorized to vest title
without it, all mortgages, liens, and other encumbrances being noted
thereon; and a purchaser, being negligent in not requiring compliance,
would be precluded from asserting estoppel. Kokenge v. Whetstone,
supra.
However, in order to determine whether the estoppel theory will
be applied, it will be necessary to determine whether the procedure
required by the statute is mandatory to pass tide or whether it is merely
a regulatory measure. The Nebraska statute, Neb. Comp. Stat. sec. 6o-
325 (1929), provides that upon the transfer of ownership of any motor
vehicle, the title shall not pass until the certificate of registration, prop-
erly executed, shall be duly filed. This statute was invoked in Jensen v.
'Vroth, 125 Neb. 832, 252 N.W. 322 (I934), which held that prop-
erty does not pass unless there is absolute compliance with the statute.
Iowa, Iowa Code sec. 4964 (930), and California, Cal. Gen. Laws
(Deering, 1931) act 5128, sec. 45, have similar provisions; but the
Iowa court, in Abraham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 215 Iowa I, 244
N.W. 675 (1932), held that the transfer of a registration card under
the statute is merely prima facie evidence of a transfer of title; while the
provisions of the California statute suggest that some property interest
passes irrespective of the law, Swing v. Ling, 129 Cal. App. 518, 19 P.
(2d) 56 (1933), although in earlier cases the court interpreted the
statute strictly. San Joaquin Valley Sec. Co. v. Prather, 123 Cal. App.
378, II P. (2d) 45 (1932). Michigan has held that the transfer of
an automobile without delivery of a certificate of title is void. Kimber v.
Eding, 262 Mich. 670, 247 N.W. 777 (933). Missouri also has
adopted the strict view, requiring absolute adherence to the provisions of
the statute. Robertson v. Snider, 63 S.W. (2d) 5o8 (Mo. 1933). An-
other group of cases has held that the failure to conform does not per se
render the sale void. Thiering v. Gage, 132 Ore. 92, 284 Pac. 832
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(1930); Parrot v. Gulick, 145 Okla. 129, 292 Pac. 48 (1930); Com-
mercial Credit Go. v. McNelly, 171 Atl. 446 (Del. 1934); In re
-Lowry, 4o F. (2d) 321 (Va. 1930). But it would seem that the legis-
lature in abrogating the Bill of Sales 4ct, which had proved ineffective in
preventing fraudulent transfers, intended this act to be applied strictly
and unless a certificate of title is issued, intended no valid title to pass.
ZENDA L. LIEBERMAN
WARRANTIES - WATER AS FOOD
Plaintiff sued a restaurant keeper as a result of illness suffered by
him from eating a dinner purchased and served at defendant's restau-
rant. The illness was caused by bacteria present in the water furnished
by defendant from its own well. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied
warranty and negligence. Held, the trial court committed prejudicial
error (I) in refusing to charge the jury on the question of implied war-
ranty'; (2) in refusing to charge the jury that a violation of the pure
food and drug laws2 of Ohio is negligence per sea. Yochem v. Gloria,
Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E. (2d) 731, 13 Ohio Op. 29 (1938).
The pure food and drug laws are statutes passed for the protection
of the public and neither intent to violate them nor knowledge of their
violation are elements of the crime.4 If these sections are invoked in this
case, it is necessary to determine that drinking water is "food"' and that
'Ohio G. C. sec. 8395 in part: "Subject to the provisions of this chapter and of any
statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness
for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows:
". When the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
2 Ohio G. C. sec. 5774 in part: "No person, within this state, shall manufacture for
sale, offer for sale, sell or deliver, or have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver,
a drug or article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this chapter, ....
Ibid., sec. 5775, in part: "The term 'food' as used in this chapter, includes all
articles used by man for food, drink, flavoring extract, confectionery, or condiment,
whether simple, mixed or compound."
Ibid., sec. 5778, in part: "Food, drink, confectionery or condiments are adulterated
within the meaning of this chapter (i) if any substance or substances have been mixed
with it, so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity;
(5) if it consists wholly, or in part, of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected,
tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not
in the case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal; . . . (7) if it contains any
added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health; ..."
'Portage Markets Co. v. George ass Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (19z4) ; Taugher
v. Bennington, 127 Ohio St. 142, 187 N.E. x9 (a933).
'Portage Markets Co. v. George, and cases cited therein, note 3, sopra.
• Ohio G. C. sec. 5775, note z, supra.
